








I THIAGARAJAN MANOHARAN 
The role of the basic units of the Party (Chinese Communist Party) in de- 
centralised development is the limited theme of this paper, published in 
two parts. 
Development at grass root level does not arise spontaneously or full- 
blown; there has to be a deus ex machina. In the PRC the basic Party units 
plan and execute a variety of development projects; their role has to be 
viewed in the light of the weak administrative structure at decentralised 
level and the still to be completed process of separation of the Party and ad- 
ministration. 
Studies already exist1 on the functioning of the Party and its relation- 
ship to the administration (nomenklatura system), complemented by that 
on the civil service system. They pertain mostly, if not wholly, to the de- 
velopments at the national (and to a limited extent, at the provincial) level 
and mainly relate to 1984. The departure in this paper is its analysis, cen- 
tering on such aspects at the basic level, xian and downwards. 
Apart from its intrinsic importance, a study of the establishment, com- 
position and autonomy in functioning of the basic Party units, as well as 
the cadre system at the basic level is relevant from the perspective of decen- 
tralised development and it is attempted in this, the first part. With the 
supreme leadership exercised by the Party, of parallel interest is an analyti- 
cal review of the self-disciplinary measures within the Party and the 
responsiveness of the cadres to the public's needs and views and their ac- 
countability under the still-evolving legal system. A discussion of these 
aspects entails a broadening of any account of the civil service system in 
the PRC and it will form the second part, in a forthcoming issue of Copen- 
hagen Papers. 
If information publicly available on the Party at the national level is 
scarce much more so it is on basic Party units. In addition to the informa- 
tion provided to the author, critical and analytical studies in the PRC itself 
have been drawn upon extensively and indicated at some tedious length 
in this paper. When specific information on basic Party units is not availa- 
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ble, applicable information, as for instance on leading cadres, at the na- 
tional level is included. 
The 1987 Policy Statement2 is taken as the referral point in this paper. If 
the reforms at the basic level envisaged in the Statement were slow in tak- 
ing effect so it will be in their reversal. The coverage of developments in the 
latter half of 1989 is based on what can be surmised from the excerpts pub- 
lished from the CCP Central Committee decision3 on further improving 
the economy, adopted on 9 November 1989. 
Separation of Party from Administration 
The reach of the state into society in the PRC is invariably equated with the 
reach of the Party, as canbe seen in references such as StatelParty, and such 
pervasiveness of the Party, with the incorporation of the State administra- 
tive apparatus in it. Some progress was made since the latter half of 1987 
towards separation of the administrative apparatus from the Party and is 
reviewed below at the basic level, It had been a slow progress. 
Progress Made 
The separation of the administration from the commune, though officially 
announced in 1983,4 requires separation from the government of the 
Party which bound together both the administration and the detailed 
management of the economy under the commune system. 
Though the separation of the Party from the government has been much 
discussed and some claims made on its progress, authoritative guidelines 
for such separation were available only in 1987: 
As the specific conditions in the central leadership,localities and enter- 
prises differ the concrete forms of separation of functions between the 
Party and the government should also va y.. . . 
Under the conditions of implementing the policy of the CCP Central 
Committee and ensuring implementation of government decrees 
throughout the country in a unified way, local Party committees at the 
provincial, city and county levels must exercise political leadership over 
their local work. Their main responsibilities are to implement the directives 
from the CCP Central Committee and from higher Party organisations, to en- 
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I sure in their local areas the implementation of directives from government at 
higher level and from the State Council, to propose policy decisions on impor- 
tant local problems, to recommend outstanding cadres to local state organs and 
to coordinate activities of various local organisations. 
The relationship between the local Party committees and government 
organs should be evolved through practice and gradually form a regular 
system. 
The separation of the Party from government at xiang and zhen level is 
to follow that at the xian level.5 (Emphasis added) 
In practice, even in the period immediately following the 1987 policy an- 
nouncement, the line between the Party and the government, between 
policy formulation and the monitoring of its implementation, at the local 
level, got blurred. Unsurprising, considering the nature of the role as- 
signed to the Party, its responsibility for major policy decisions and coordi- 
nation at local level and for supervising the local implementation of State 
policies and decisions and its authority with respect to the appointment of 
the local leading cadres. 
The extent and nature of the progress made following the 1987 policy 
statement can be gauged by the experience of ten xian from ten provinces 
which were held up as models by the secretariat of the CCP.6 On the basis 
of two such xian, on which some details were provided to the author, some 
general observations can be made. 
The separation is evolving gradually downwards from the xian level. It 
is being brought about by public discussions, with the Chairman of the 
Standing Committee of the Local People's Congress, the Chairman of the 
Local People's Consultative Committee and the local Party unit participat- 
ing. During the separation it was agreed to by the Party that the Party su- 
pervisory committees in administrative departments will be abolished 
and that the local Party units will close their own supervisory departments 
corresponding to some administrative departments. Such abolition of 
overlaying units of Party control is intended to reduce Party interference in 
day to day administration. During the discussion of the separation process 
informal arrangements on the relationship between the Party and the Lo- 
cal People's Congress (reviewed in Part I1 of this paper) were also arrived 
at. 
Some clarification of the Party providing leadership without interfering 
with the administration is provided by the agreement during the separa- 
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tion process, as indicated by the experience in one of the two xian: 
The Party is to confine itself to reviewing the annual plan, formulate the 
changes necessary, draw up plans for city construction, drought relief and 
afforestation and forward them to the administration for implementation. 
On the vexed problem of allocation of fertilisers the Party is to elicit pub- 
lic views on the adequacy and timeliness of its supply and bring them to 
the notice of the administration but it is not to undertake the administra- 
tive tasks of fixing the amount or supplying to specific areas or house- 
holds. 
The Party will audit and review the annual budget as drawn up by the 
administration before it is presented to the Local People's Congress for 
consideration and approval. 
In general, it is envisaged that the Party's views and decisions are to be 
conveyed to the administration through the Party unit in the Standing 
Committee of the Local People's Congress, thus ensuring a certain degree 
of popular discussion. 
In the case of the other xian referred to above, the Party relinquished its 
direct control over the supervision of administrative departments and 
reduced the number of its own secretariat groups with such supervisory 
functions: 
For instance, the Party supervision of administrative personnel was 
handed over in its entirety to the personnel division of the administration 
and the parallel units in the Party were abolished. 
The Party propaganda unit will not be concerned with cultural, public 
hygiene and communication activities which henceforth will be fully 
handed over to the administration; the Party United Front secretariat will 
withdraw from religious and minority affairs which will be exclusively 
handled by the administration. 
Rationalisation of the internal Party structure was carried out, reducing 
the number of organisations and cadres with scope for interfering with 
routine administration: 
For instance, of the thirteen departments in the secretatariat directly un- 
der the xian Party committee only five were retained i.e. central office, 
Party organisation department, propaganda department, united front 
department and political research department. 
Of the nine Party cells directly under the xian Party Committee only five 
were retained, those located in the Local People's Congress, Local People's 
Consultative Congress, People's Court, People's Procuratorate and Trade 
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Union Congress; those in the administration, public security office, Peo- 
ple's Bank and Agricultural Bank were abolished. 
Of the twenty-five Party branches and units which formed the leading 
groups under the xian Party committee, only three were retained, namely 
those concerned with Party organs, civil defence and old cadres; the rest, 
concerned with administration and economic affairs were reduced to 
small groups and amalgamated. 
The issue of separation of the Party from the administration in the case 
of collective township and village enterprises does not arise as the collec- 
tive administrative organs, which are headed by the Party officials appoint 
the managers, formulate the budget and inspect the perf~rmance.~ Re- 
cently there has been a spurt of leasing out of small-scale enterprises on 
the basis of contracts. The larger proportion of them has been leased out 
to the local Party secretaries or high level Party officials.' 
The two instances of xian cited above are among those held up as 
models, during the period immediately following the policy announce- 
ment in October 1987. However the umbilical cord to the Party continued 
to be strong. Even during 1988 and the beginning of 1989, the various pub- 
lic reports in the PRC indicate three differing trends: some Party units 
voluntarily relinquishing their control over administrative organs; the 
main decisions, not only at the policy but also at the administrative level, being 
taken by the Party units with administration carrying out such decisions; 
where the administration is weak or not yet fully organised, the adminis- 
tration completely delegating its role to the Party units (yidang dai zheng). 
The main effort continued to be at the xian level and even in the two xian 
cited here there was no perceptible indication that such comprehensive 
separation was reaching down to the xiang and cun levels. 
Various factors account for the slow rate of change, in addition to the ad- 
mitted lack of sufficient competence in the administration at the xian level 
and, much more so, below it and of adequate decentralisation of powers to 
the local government organisations. The number of secretariat units at the 
local Party level, forming an overlay on the administration, shows no sign 
of dimunition and even exceeds the norms prescribed for their number 
and strength by the Central Committee of the  part^.^ The rectification of 
the Party organization, based on the four basic principles, which was begun 
in 1983, had proceeded from the highest level and was slow to reach the 
xiang and cun levels. Considering if only the numbers involved it was not 
an easily accomplished task. 
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Nomenklatura System 
A reliable indicator of the separation of the Party from administration 
would be a detailed information on the PRC's nomenklatura system. Such 
information as is publicly available pertains only to 1984, and that too at 
the State (central) level, and to the devolution of the nomenklatura authority 
from the Central Committee of the Party to the Party's lower levels. Details 
on the nomenklatura system at and below the provincial level are not avail- 
able. lo 
Two among the administrative reforms announced in 1987 and adopted, 
as indicated above in the two model examples of xian, have a bearing on the 
nomenklatura system at lower levels:*1 one pertains to the overlapping of 
the authority of Party departments over the corresponding administrative 
departments; the other relates to decentralisation of powers to local Party 
committees. 
Another indirect indication of the possible evolution of the nomenklatura 
system is the government personnel reform announced in 1987 for gradual 
implementation: 
Government functionaries are to be divided into two categories: politi- 
cal and professional (zhengwu yuan and yewu yuan). 
Political functionaries are to be handled in line with the Constitution 
and the Organisation Law (zuzhi fa). A system of limited tenure will be 
enforced. They are subject to the open supervision of society. The Party 
central authorities and local units at all levels and the political functionaries 
elected according to the recommendations by the People's Congresses under the 
law are to supervise and control the Party members among the political func- 
tionaries. 
Professional functionaries are to be managed in accordance with the 
government functionary law; a system of permanent appointment will 
be practised. All those who intend to enter its ranks must sit for an open 
competitive examination. Their promotion and demotion and their re- 
wards and punishments are to be mainly based on their perfor- 
mance.. . . 
Leaders and working personnel of Party organisations and leading or- 
gans will be under the management of the Party committees at all levels. 
A system similar to that for State functionaries will be established for or- 
gans exercising State powers, judicial organs and procuratorial organs. 
Mass organisations, enterprises and institutions are to work out their 
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management regulations and rules. .... It will take a long time to establish 
and perfect such a system.. . . l2 
(Emphasis added) 
Some light on the nomenklatura system at the basic level is provided by a 
xian Party committee manual (1988) which, among others, lists the leading 
cadres under its direct supervision. Such cadres fall under three groups: 
1. Leading officials of the departments of the xian Party committee, the 
leader and deputy leader of the Party committee in xiang, zhen and cheng- 
xiangzhen and representatives of xian Party committee in judicial organs. 
2. Members of the Standing Committee of the xian People's Congress and 
director of its secretariat, members of the Standing Committee of the Local 
People's Consultative Congress, head and deputy-head of the xian Peo- 
ple's Court and Procuratorate, head and deputy-head of the administra- 
tion in town and township, director of civil defence. 
3. Deputy directors of the departments under the Standing Committee of 
the People's Congress and Consultative Congress, deputy directors of 
departments in xian administration, deputy director of civil defence, direc- 
tors of health and environment and heads of high level educational and 
research institutions. 
In the period following the 1987 Policy Announcement the appointment 
of and control over the cadres in group 2 above is to be carried out by the 
xian Party committee in consultation with the Local People's Congress; the 
cadres under group 3 above are to come under the jurisdiction of the Per- 
sonnel Affairs Bureau of the Administration. 
Basic Party Units13 
There continues to be increasing emphasis on the establishment, improve- 
ment in the membership composition and enhancement in developmen- 
tal role, of the basic Party units. In practice, in their functioning the nearest 
and highest supervisory role is exercised by the xian Party Committee. 
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Organisation 
Currently, it is reported that there are 47.8 million Party members, of which 
24.9 millions are in the town and townships (xiang and zhen, mainly rural 
areas); since 1978 to 1987 the proportion of Party members to the popula- 
tion in towns and townships, despite the recent emphasis in organising 
and supervising the basic Party units, has increased from 2.5 to 3 per cent. 
According to another press report, there are 2.76 million basic Party units 
of which 1.23 millions are in the rural areas.14 
Every member of the Party belongs to a Party branch. Any Chinese 
citizen who has completed eighteen years of age, is willing to abide by the 
Party's programmes and guiding principles and by its Constitution, is will- 
ing to join a Party unit and work diligently and is ready to pay the Party 
membership fees regularly can apply for membership. Since 1983, in the 
selection of Party cadres increasing emphasis is laid on de cai jianbei (ability 
as well as political integrity), specifically spelt out in detail in the Party 
Constitution, article 35, as six basic requirements. 
In brief,the Party branch (dung zhibu) is the basic Party organization 
(jiceng dangzuzhi). Wherever there are three or more members - as for in- 
stance in a xiang, zhen, cooperative economic group, production unit, ad- 
ministrative organ - a basic Party branch is established. Where the Party 
strength calls for it or the nature of the work requires it general Party 
branches (zong zhibu based on more than fifty members) are organised. 
Party branches are organised at the cun level and where there are less than 
three members a Party branch is established jointly with neighbouring 
cun: it is noteworthy that while the State administration reaches down 
only upto the xiang level, the Party reaches down further to the cun level, 
Where there are more than hundred Party members a basic Party commit- 
tee (jiceng weiyuanhui) is formed, which supervises the branch and the 
general branch committees. For all practical purposes, like admission to 
membership and discipline, it is the Party committee which makes the de- 
cisions, not the Party branches. The committees and the branches hold 
periodic general meetings and elect their standing committees, according 
to procedures laid down in the Party constitution and Party announce- 
ments for all elections in the Party. 
There have been repeated calls from the highest Party levels for the es- 
tablishment and strengthening of basic Party units.15 Currently there are 
69,842 towns and townships, 5,680 sub-district offices, 845,025 rural peo- 
ple's committees and 86,824 neighbourhood committees and the establish- 
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ment and efficient functioning of basic Party units is indeed a formidable 
task. Two overall indicators of the progress made can be observed from the 
sparse statistics available. By the end of 1987, of the total Party members 
27.3 percent were below 35 years of age and, compared with 1983, the 
members with middle and higher level education increased from 12.8 per- 
cent to 28.5 per cent. In the rural area (xiangzhen) Party members with mid- 
dle and higher level education increased, as a proportion to the total, from 
31.6 percent in 1983 to 39.6 percent in 1987; the corresponding decline in 
those with lower level education was from 51.7 percent to 46.8 percent and 
the proportion of illiterates, from 16.7 to 13.7 percent.16 
Information on the establishment and functioning of the basic Party 
units in the rural areas, as on any other aspect of the internal working of the 
Party, is hard to come by. A survey made in 1987 of a xiang, azhen and three 
cun in Shanghai city, Chuanshe xian, and of 8 representative enterprises in 
them, provides some indications, particularly as the xian, though prosper- 
ous, includes poor villages.17 As indicated in the table below, according to 
the survey, the number of Party members engaged in agricultural activities 
had decreased between 1983 to 1987, with a consequent increase in the 
number of basic Party committees in the township and village enterprises 
(See Table 1). 
Table 1. Rural Basic Partv Units 
1983 1987 change 
Total number of Party 860 1121 +261 
branches in the xian 
Proportion to the total 43.4% 34.3% -3681 
of Party members in 
primary agricultural activities 
Party branches in subsidiary 
agricultural activities 
Party members in manufacturing 22 4% 25.3% +240 
as percentage of their total 
Total number of Party branches 226 418 + 192 
in manufacturing units 
The survey highlights the basic problem in the establishment and func- 
tioning of the basic Party units in the rural areas. In the villages, a signifi- 
cant proportion of the Party members (22.4%) was more than 61 years old; 
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nearly half the Party members had entered the Party before 1966 and are 
not sympathetic to the reforms and the proportion of illiterates and of 
those with little education accounted for 50.4%. With the exodus of edu- 
cated young Party members to the manufacturing sector, the Party secre- 
tary is involved in economic management, at the cost of Party construc- 
tion. 
For purposes of establishing and strengthening basic Party units the 
nearest high level Party organisation is the basic local Party congress at the 
xian (and corresponding administrative) level and its organ, the xian Party 
committee. In addition to appointing and inspecting the work of its organs 
the xian Congress has the power to discuss and decide important issues at 
the xian level in line with the principles and policies laid down by higher 
level Party organisations. The extent of control it exercises over the lower 
Party organisations varies according to the area, population, economic ad- 
vancement etc. of the latter; generally the lower such organisations are the 
more of an implementor of the directives of the xian Party committee they 
are while the higher they are in the hierarchy the more latitude they are 
given by the xian Party committee with respect to local policy decisions.18 
It is not uncommon to find xian level leading cadres devoting more atten- 
tion to economic management affairs, neglecting basic Party construction 
work and a quota of one- fourth of their time for basic Party work is being 
fixed, except in the case of the xian Party secretary and deputy-secretary,19 
The composition of the xian Congress reflects the responsibilities as- 
signed to it. The number of delegates to the Congress from lower level 
units is fixed by the secretariat of the Party at the xian level and generally 
varies between 200 to 400. Broad ratios are fixed among the various groups 
regarding the desirable composition of the delegates: for instance leading 
cadres are to form 60 per cent, skilled technicians 20 per cent,frontline 
leaders in various fields 18 per cent, armed forces 2 per cent, women at 
least 20 per cent. A proportion for minorities, based on their population, 
is also to be observed. Half the delegates are to be below 45 years of age. In 
the light of these rough overall proportions, the secretariat of the Party at 
lower level units draws up a preliminary list of candidates and in the finali- 
sation of the list the Party members' views in intra-party discussions are to 
be fully taken into account. Beginnings were made, subsequent to the 1987 
Policy Announcement, with a plurality of candidates in some xian. The 
voting is by secret ballot and the winning candidate needs to have at least 
half of the votes cast. The Party members have the right to mark on the bal- 
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lot the name of any Party member other than those in the slate of candi- 
dates presented. 
Functioning 
The Party constitution enjoins an eight-fold task on the basic Party units; 
in addition to implementing Party policies and directives and promoting 
public awareness of them, the basic Party units are to identify and support 
advanced elements in socialist construction, to correct mistakes in people's 
views and anti-social tendencies and appropriately settle conflicts among 
people and to promote self-criticism among the Party members. 
Since the 1987 Policy Statement there have been moves to strengthen the 
powers of the local Party branches (dangzuzhi de difangh~a).~' So far a 
specific implementation to a limited extent is the relinquishing of the con- 
trol exercised by the Party organisation committee at higher administrative 
level on the Party organisation at lower administrative level in enterprises; 
such control is to be vested in the local Party branches and committees. 
One of the important issues yet to be completely resolved is which type of 
enterprise,(large, medium or small) is to be put under what level of local 
area Party units under this change in Party leadership. Above all is the 
overhanging issue of the need for upgrading the professional competence 
of the cadres in the local Party units. 
At the decentralised level the basic Party unit (in particular, the Party 
secretary) is exhorted to act as the leader and backbone of development ac- 
tivities as well as a powerful spearhead (zhandou baolei). In the context of a 
developing country like the PRC where the rural administrative structure 
is weak and the separation of the Party from the administration has not yet 
reached down to the basic level such a role for the basic Party units be- 
comes meaningful. Many such model examples are held up for emula- 
tion2' and the nature of such activities is illustrated below: 
Crop planning: integrated use of land at the village level, of forestry, 
wasteland and cultivable land: decision on the allocation of land for 
household foodgrains, for individual household contracts and contracts 
for joint mechanised cultivation. 
Rural industrialisation: at the time of separation of the commune, deci- 
sions on the allocation of commune enterprises among the collectives and 
private individuals; organising technical assistance from among the Party 
cadres. 
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Mobilising financial and labour resources from the villagers for collec- 
tive accumulation and investment in rural infrastructure. 
Assistance to poor families: through visits and constant contacts, each 
Party cadre attending to the problems encountered in production and in 
welfare payments. 
Spearheading the prevention and safety measures in times of natural 
disasters. 
Leading cadres 
Leading cadres form the backbone of the administration. The bureaucracy 
is in the process of being structured in keeping with the demands of 
modernisation; at the same time some of the forms of people's control of 
bureaucratic behaviour, practised since the Liberation years, have been re- 
tained. Though the central administration reaches down to the xiang level 
there is in practice considerable latitude for actions by the administration 
at the xiang level. 
Selection 
The selection and tenure of appointment of leading cadresz2 fall into 
broadly four categories: by election (xuanju renqi), by internal appointment 
(weiren renqi), by public invitation to apply (pinren renqi) and by examina- 
tion and evaluation (kaoren renqi); in internal appointment, selection made 
by the Party from within itself, the system of examination and evaluation 
has been introduced by the Central Committee in 1982. The election 
process, as it operates in the PRC, is applied in the case of political cadres 
(zhengwu yuan) and the appointment system, in the case of administrative 
cadres (yewu yuan). The selection of cadres fromresponses to public invita- 
tion to apply is, by and large, for posts requiring specialised skills. In addi- 
tion to the emphasis on cadres1 ability as well as political integrity (de cai 
jianbei) the cadre system is to be modernised fulfilling four requirements. 
It should have more political consciousness, have a younger age-profile, be 
more educated and professional (geming hua, nianqing hua, zhishi hua, zhu- 
anye hua). The four criteria are to be applied, in particular, in the case of 
leading cadres. 
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Internal selection and promotion 
Public examination system for selection of cadres is conducted by the ad- 
ministration at and above the xian level: entrance to the examination is 
voluntary, the questions are to be set in consultation with the departments 
concerned and the candidates are to be examined in groups. The selected 
candidates are to be vetted for their political awareness and, to summarise 
a highly involuted procedure, have to be approved by both the higher level 
Party committee and administrative units. The job titles and grades have 
been announced, with a view to enforcing a job responsibility system; 
however it is a common refrain of commentators in China that it is not 
scientific. The Party committee is enjoined to elicit the assessment of the 
cadres by the public. The dossier on the candidates is also c~nsulted. '~ 
Among the ten features of the cadre to be listed in the dossier are the 
cadre's political consciousness and class origin; according to the Party 
regulation of 1980, as revised in 1983, the inclusion of the class origin of the 
cadre is to get a complete profile and is not meant for purposes of selection 
and promotion. 
Evaluation of the cadres is organised by the Party unit at next higher 
level, in cooperation with the administrative organs. The evaluation also 
takes place within the Party. The cadres are asked to evaluate the perfor- 
mance of their superiors in three broad groups - outstanding, competent 
and not competent. Such evaluation takes place and is transmitted in con- 
fidence to the next higher level Party unit which organises it. Usually such 
evaluation takes place departmentally; though the public is supposed to 
participate, at best such participation is confined to non-Party members in 
the same department. The absence of a scientific job classification, the lack 
of inter-departmental comparison and the broad classification of compe- 
tence into three groups and other obvious aspects renders this process of 
limited validity. There are frequent reports in the press on the results of 
such evaluation, with comparatively less references to promotion or de- 
motion of cadres as a con~equence.'~ 
More scientific methods of evaluation are now being introduced on a 
trial basis.25 The factors to be judged are political consciousness (de), abil- 
ity (neng), diligence (qin) and physical condition (ti). 
In the absence, again, of overall Party statistics, some accounts appear- 
ing in Chinese journals have to be drawn upon for a study of the present 
attributes of the leading cadres.26 
According to the published accounts, cadres are still promoted and 
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selected from internal ranks. In the case of cadres selected during and be- 
fore the Cultural Revolution, internal promotion (taijie shi) and the stress 
on class origin (weicheng fenlun) were the dominant factors. Their continu- 
ing impact can be gauged by one of the findings in a country-wide survey 
in September 1986 of the leading Party cadres in 177 xian including cities 
and qi (county-level administration in national minority areas): out of 1,760 
seniormost Party officials, 708 had entered the Party during or before the 
Cultural Revolution. According to the same survey, of the 1,826 leading 
cadres whose age was surveyed, 60% was below 45 years of age and 8% be- 
low 35 while those above 56 accounted for 14%. 
On the extent of education and specialisation of the leading cadres the 
province-wise findings of a survey of 685 leading cadres in Hubei province 
are summarised below: (See Table 2 and Table 3). 
Table 2,Cadre Specialisation ( O/O ) 
Enginee- Finance Culture Economic Politics Others 
ring Econo- History Manage- Law 
mics Philosophy ment 
Table 3. Cadre Training Requirements ( O/O ) 
Stage of studylsubject Systematic In part Not at all 
Understanding of 'four 38.33 53.72 7.45 
basic principles' 
Scientific leadership 7.30 67.30 25.40 
and management 
The study identifies the areas where the knowledge of the leading 
cadres has to be supplemented and lists their number as proportion to the 
total surveyed: modern management, 62.63%; scientific leadership (ling- 
dao kexlle), 60.4%; economic management, 45.55%; and basic understand- 
ing of Marxism, 32.7%. Of urgent importance, according to the survey, is 
the need for strengthening of the leading cadres1 skill in understanding 
and implementing policies (juece nengli) among 34.89 % of them, in their 
communication skills, 33.87% and in their specialised skills (zhuanye neng- 
li), 31.019'0. 
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Democratic Election of Leading Cadres 
Under the 1986 lawz7 the commanding positions in the local administra- 
tion and in judicial organs are filled by elections by Local People's Con- 
gress at xian and corresponding administrative levels: the head and 
deputy head of the local administration and, subject to the concurrence at 
their higher levels, the head of the People's Court and the People's Pro- 
curatorate. The Local People's Congress at xiang and similar administrative 
levels elect only the head and deputy head of the local administration; the 
appointments to judicial organs come from their higher levels. The law 
also provides that any inappropriate (bu shidang) decision by a lower level 
Local People's Congress can be set aside by the next higher level People's 
Congress. 
In its working, so far, the electoral process for the selection of political 
officials has resulted in all these appointments going to the Party mem- 
bers. At the xian level, it is the Standing Committee of the People's Con- 
gress ( there being no Standing Committee at the xiang level) which in 
close consultation with the Party Committee in the Congress proposes 
candidates and, except in the case of deputy chief of the administration, 
the proposals equal the number of posts. The majority in the Standing 
Committee (as well as in the Congress) consists of Party members though 
other groups are represented; in fact, to avoid conflict between the Con- 
gress and the Party there are some instances where the Chairman of the 
Standing Committee is also the local Party Secretary. 
Under the 1987 law," self-government by the villages (cun) is vested in 
the Village People's Committee elected by all the villagers above 18 years of 
age or representatives from each household. The chairmen of the Village 
People's Committee, and its sub-committees, mainly the People's Media- 
tion Committee, the Public Security Committee and the Public Health 
Committee, are directly or indirectly elected by the villagers. The leading 
office-holders are invariably Party members. 
The details regarding the establishment, dissolution and internal work- 
ing of the Village People's Committee are to be fixed by the State adminis- 
tration at the xiang level. All arrangements and decisions have to be 
reported to the State administration at the xian level. All these administra- 
tive units at the xian and xiang levels are, as seen above, headed by 'Party 
members, thus reflecting on the composition of the Village People's Com- 
mittee. In fact, according to some local accounts, heads of the Village Com- 
mittees are not infrequently appointed by higher level administration. 
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Experience with the operation of the 1987 law is still limited and the Vil- 
lage People's Committees still function as the former production brigades 
did, particularly in villages where village collective enterprises are impor- 
tant and contribute to the general development of the villages. Consider- 
ing that in the villages the Party members are generally better educated it 
is hardly surprising that the leading positions go to them. 
Selection by Public Notification 
Posts requiring specialised skills in the technological and economic 
management fields are to be filled by public notification inviting appli- 
c a n t ~ . ~ ~  The positions have to be in the national job allocation plan. The 
implementation of the system is under the guidance of the personnel bu- 
reau at the provincial level. Along with the professional qualifications the 
requirement of political consciousness (de) is to be kept in mind. 
Many factors, according to the commentators in PRC,30 inhibit a fuller 
application of this system: the progress still to be made in scientific job 
classification and job description; the limits placed on mobility, particu- 
larly on skilled and scientific personnel; the frequent failure to conduct ex- 
amination in groups, as required by law and the practice of individual ex- 
amination, etc. Some recent measures have expanded the scope of this 
system as for instance the measure introduced under the 1986 law on State 
enterprises, enabling employment under the contract system, and tech- 
nology contract system in the rural areas, 
Deployment 
Job allocation to cadres is subject to overall plan. The Ministry of Personnel 
is nominally in charge of drawing up and executing the cadre allocation 
plan. Under the anouncements3* made on 1 August 1988 cadre discipli- 
nary actions, which are within the jurisdiction of the Party disciplinary 
groups in government agencies, are henceforth to be handled by the 
Ministry of Supervision (re-established in 1987); also, while the Party will 
continue to manage its own leading personnel and organs, the Ministry of 
Personnel will manage state administrative and judicial personnel. With 
the slow progress in the separation of the Party from the administration, 
currently both Party units and personnel departments in the administra- 
tion execute the cadre deployment and related.management functions. 
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Except in the case of political officials and specialists recruited by public 
invitation to apply, the mobility of cadres, territorially or hierarchically, is 
of limited extent. In practice (1989), invariably, leading cadres working in 
administrative and other organs at the centre and in provincial capitals, big 
cities and capitals of autonomous areas are moved throughout the coun- 
try; leading cadres who are assigned to local areas are transferred only 
within their cities, autonomous regions and provinces. Cadres with a na- 
tional minority background are transferred within areas where minorities 
live. The normal tenure at a particular place is as long as five to ten years. 
In addition to the overall allocation plan, the lack of mobility is attributa- 
ble, according to commentators in the PRC, to the slow progress towards 
scientific job classification and description, the lack of adequate informa- 
tion channels on vacancies, the 'locking up' of personnel departmentally, 
the continued preference for internal promotion, etc. The insufficiency in 
the rotation of cadres denies them career development and opportunities 
for self-improvement through on-the-job training. It also results in the es- 
tablishment of personal connections (guanxi) locally. 
At Decentralised Level 
The basic level of administration is at the xiang After the separa- 
tion of the administration from the commune, in place of 52,346 com- 
munes, 91,590 xiang-zhen administrative units have been established and 
698,613 production brigades have been transformed into 948,600 Village 
People's Committees. In the process of establishing the administrative 
units and the Committees, the large-sized communes were split into more 
than one administrative unit and large-sized production brigades were 
made into administrative units, with the objective of bringing people 
closer to the administration. 
At the xianglevel, apart from the heads of the administration who are ap- 
pointed by the Local People's Congress the administrative cadres comprise 
those who are sent down from the xian administration and those whom 
the xiang administration directly appoints. Under the direction of the xian 
administration the xiang administration has started introducing the prac- 
tice of public examination and selection by public invitation. 
Cadre allocation below the provincial level is decided at the provincial 
level and invariably the administrative cadres to be sent to the rural areas, 
xiang and cun, are determined at the xian level. Currently, at the xiang level 
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there are more than 20 branches of the xian administration. The familiar 
phenomenon in local administration, the responsibility of officials verti- 
cally to their higher organs and horizontally to the local superiors (and in 
the case of the PRC, to local Party units) has drawn critical comments at lo- 
cal level; added to them are the complaints that the officials sent from xian 
level are too many and often lack awareness of local conditions. Referred 
to as tiao tiao kuai kuai, .the result is a lack of administrative co-ordination 
and accountability and local space for manoeuverability. 
An important impact of the split in responsibility can be observed in the 
working of the central-local relations. In the PRC, though it is the centre 
which alone can enact fiscal tax laws, all tax collection is exclusively carried 
out by local officials. Also in the implementation of tax laws the provincial 
government is allowed to adapt them to local conditions at their discretion, 
a provision which local officials avail themselves of, giving tax exemptions 
to stimulate local development at the expense of central revenues. 
In the context of local administration, an interesting experiment, held up 
as a model, is reported33 from Guilin province, Huaxun xian, where ad- 
ministrative responsibility over its cadres has been handed down to a 
township, Hongshi Lazi zhen. Under an agreement with the xian adminis- 
tration covering personnel, property and materials, the township ad- 
ministration will not change the job classification, status, salary and wel- 
fare benefits of the officials, nor the state-planned allocation of finance and 
materials. Subject to the formal approval of the xian administration the 
township administration will have the power to dismiss the officials, if 
necessary; such powers over Party cadres in the administration will be ex- 
ercised by the Party branch at the township level. In any transfer, promo- 
tion or removal from office of the officials at the township level, the xian ad- 
ministration has to seek the concurrence of the township administration. 
Exit 
The retirement age of the administrative cadres has been fixed at 60 years 
for males and 55 for females, with a minimum of fifteen years of service. In 
the Party for cadres holding senior positions at the centre and in 
provinces, cities and autonomous regions the retirement age is 65. Subject 
to the approval of higher authorities the cadres can leave the administra- 
tion or the Party. 
To encourage a younger age-composition and the exit of cadres of the 
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Cultural Revolution vintage, there has been a series of  regulation^.^^ The 
financial support for those who leave are generally more generous than 
that for those who retire normally; it is based on the length of revolution- 
ary service (canjia geming gongzuo shijian), which has been precisely de- 
fined.35 
The Party has repeatedly called for the exit of cadres who, because of old 
age or health conditions, cannot function adequately. As an indirect in- 
ducement for elderly administrative officials, particularly the scientific 
and technical cadres, to exit, they are allowed to engage in economic activi- 
ties and are subsidised if their earnings fall short of minimum require- 
ments; but they are cautioned against misusing their old official connec- 
tions. 
The impact of such encouraging policies has not been significant, as can 
be seen from the statistics on the age-composition of Party members given 
above. 
Personnel Statistics 
Some approximate estimates of the total strength of leading cadres are 
given below (Table 4) : 





State (total) 5.97 1.4 
At xian level 
and below 1.43 0.4 
Collective sector 
Cities (cheng-zhen) 
Rural (nongcun) 0.81 0.19 
' Covers national administrative organs (guojia jiguan), Party administratie organs 
(zhengdang jiguan) and social groups (shehui tuanti). 
A cutt-off point of 120 yuan basic wage is applied, based on the basic salary of cadres 
at supervisory level in the State sector. Distribution of staff by salary groups is given by 
a sample survey of 2,049 State units; for the collective sector, the porportion given for 
agriculture and related units is applied. 
Sources: Zhongguo Tongjiju, Shehui Tongjisi bian, Zhongguo Laodong Gongzi Tongji Zi- 
liao 1949-1985 (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 1987) (PRC wage statistics publi- 
cation). 
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The administrative establishment, whose strength is tentatively estimated 
above is impressive. Its self-discipline and its accountability to the public 
fotm the theme of the second part of this paper. 
Thiagarajan Manoharan is a Senior Research Associate at the Center for East and 
Southeast Asian Studies, University of Copenhagen. 
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was surveyed in 900 enterprises, with 
close to one-fifth of them collective en- 
terprises, in 1985 indicate the prepon- 
derance of bureaucratic appointees: 
60.1%, bureaucratic appointment; 
30.7%, bureaucratic appointment in 
consultation with workers; 4.4%, 
directly elected by the factory em- 
ployees; 1.0%, through Workers' Con- 
gress; and 1.8%, through management 
contracts. 
For details see Zhongguo Jingji Tizhi 
Gaige Yanjiusuo, Gaige: women mianlin 
de tiaozhan yu xuanze (Reform: chal- 
lenges and choices facing us) (Beijing: 
Zhongguo Jingji Chubanshe, 1986), p. 
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author's field study. 
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qiye dangzhibu ruhe fahui baozheng 
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play and ensure the supervision by 
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Dabao, 1988, No. 4, p. 29. In Changde 
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ies, 20 to senior Party members and 
only 6 to private individuals. In fact, as 
the leased-out units are economically 
and managerially weak, there is a 
growing perception that Party cells 
should be formed in them to provide 
guidance. See, for instance, Heilong- 
jiang Shengwei Zuzhibu Zuzhichu, 
))Guanyu zurenqiye dang de jianshe 
gongzuo qingkuang de diaochacc (An 
investigation of the situation regarding 
the work of establishing the Party in 
leased enterprises), Dung Jian, 1988, 
NO. 4, pp. 40-41. 
9 For details see Xiao Li, ))Anzhao dang 
zheng fenkai de yuanze tantao gaige 
dang de gongzuo jigou de luzicc (A dis- 
cussion of the approaches to reform of 
work organization of the Party accord- 
ing to the principle of the separation of 
the Party from administration), Zheng- 
zhixue Yanjiu, 1988, No. 2, pp. 7-10. Also 
Niu Yaying, Li Jun, ))Lishun dang 
zheng jigou shi shixian zhizheng dang 
de lingdao zhineng de genben tujingx 
(Smoothening the Party - administra- 
tion structure is the basic route for 
realising the leadership functions of 
the party in power), Dangzheng Luntan, 
1988, No. 3, pp. 18-23. 
10 Information on the PRC's nomenklatura 
system is restricted. Some information, 
as of 1984, is available in an internal 
publication: Zhongguo Renmin Yin- 
hang Renshisi, Renshi gongzuo wenjian 
xuanbian (Selected documents on per- 
sonnel work) (Zhongguo Jinrong 
Chubanshe, 1985). Hereafter RSGZ. In 
a reform announced in 1983, the num- 
ber of cadres under the direct manage- 
ment of the Central Committee of the 
Party was reduced from 13,000 to 7,000 
and the nomenklatura authority was 
transferred to Party committees and 
other cadre management units at lower 
levels. The objective of such decentrali- 
sation was to promote efficient person- 
nel management. See ))Yi gaige de jing- 
shen jiasu lingdao banzi he ganbu 
duiwu de ))sihuacc jianshecc (For estab- 
lishing vigorous and speedy 'four 
modernisations' of leading groups and 
cadre ranks). RSGZ, p. 114. 
11 1987 Policy Statement: 
On overlapping of authority: Party 
departments that overlay correspond- 
ing government departments should 
be abolished; the administrative affairs 
they are now handling should be 
handed over to government depart- 
ments. Party leading groups in govern- 
ment departments, which are respon- 
sible to the Party committees at the next 
higher level, should be abolished 
gradually. Discipline inspection com- 
missions of the Party should not deal 
with infractions of law or of administra- 
tive regulations but should concentrate 
on fostering Party spirit and enforcing 
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Party discipline. Wanli, ed., Dang de jianshe (Party con- 
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Congress, November 1,1987). See also, years CCP admits 1.2 million new party 
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plenary session of the Central Commit- Chinese-style basic party-administra- 
tee at the 11th Party Congress). For spe- tion), Renmin Ribao, February 25, 1988, 
cifically on Party branch (the manual p. 1. 
which the author found to be in regular 16 Op. cit., note 14. 
use, during his field study) see Dang 17 See Shanghaishi Dangjiao Xitong 
zhibu gongzuo shouce (Handbook on Dang de Jianshe Diaochazu, ))Guanyu 
Party branch work) (Shanghai: Renmin Shanghaishi Chuanshe xian nongcun 
Chubanshe, 1985). Also see, for in- jiceng dang zuzhi jianshe zhuang- 
stance: Wang Jianxin, Yang Shuhai, kuang de diaochacc (Investigation of 
Qian Shuhai, Qian Guoliang and Yan conditions regarding rural basic party 
Dianru, Ganbu guanli gailun (Introduc- units in Chuanshe County, Shanghai 
tion to cadre management) (Shenyang: City), Dangzheng Luntan, 1988, No. 11, 
Liaoning Daxue Chubanshe, 1986); pp. 38-42. 
Zhongyang Heilongjiang Shengwei, 18 See Hu Guozhang, Zhang Deshun and 
Dangde shenghuo zhishi shohce (Hand- Fan Huyang, ))Shilun difang dangwei 
book of instructions on Party activities) de wu da tezhengcc (Views on five im- 
(Beijing: Zhongguo Zhanwang portant characteristics of local Party 
Chubanshe, 1986); Zhonggong Zhon- committees), Xuexi Yu Shijian, 1988, 
gyang Zuzhibu Yanjiushi, Zuohao xin No. 10, pp. 43-45. 
shiqi de ganbu gongzuo (Doing well the 19 See Shengwei Zuzhibu Nongcun 
cadre work in the new period) (Beijing: Zuzhichu, nJiaqiang nongcun dang de 
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level), Xin Changzheng, 1988, No. 12, 
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guanli de sikaocc (Reflexion on Party 
units managing the dependency of en- 
terprise management units), Dang- 
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Chubanshe, 1987). 
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respect to all functionaries at some not 
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percent of the national total. For details 
of the contents, with specimen forms, 
arrangements for storage and con- 
fidentiality, availability and use see 
Chen Zhiwei, Li Guoqing, Xian dan- 
ganguan yewu zhishi (Instructions for 
county dossier office functions) 
(Guizhou: Renmin Chubanshe, 1987). 
24 See, for instance, the report on Fujian, 
Guangdong and Gansu provinces, at 
city and xian levels in ))Geti minzhu 
kaoping lingdao ganbu qude chen- 
gong(( (Successful democratic examina- 
tion of leading cadres individually), 
Renmin Ribao, July 11, 1987, p. 4; ))Xianji 
ganbu niandu gongzuo kaoke jiang 
kuoda shidiancc ( Expansion of pilot 
project on annual examination of the 
work of cadres at county level) Renmin 
Ribao, September 25, 1987, p. 4; for a 
report on demotion of cadres as a result 
of evaluation see nJianshibu minzhu 
kaoping sijiu ji ganbucc (Democratic ex- 
amination of cadres in 49 grades by 
Construction Ministry) Renmin Ribao, 
October 15, 1987, p. 1. For a perception 
in China of the limitations of the evalu- 
ation system, see, for instance, Zhang 
Hua, c&hilun dui xianji dangzheng 
lingdaoganbu shixing quanmian 
kaokecc (Views on the all-round exami- 
nation of leading cadres in Party and 
government at the county level), Kexue 
Shehuizhuyi Yanjiu, 1988, No. 4, pp. 43- 
45. 
in this note, unavoidably, no distinc- 25 See, for instance, Zhu Zongwei, ))Ben 
tion is made between the two and the shijujidangzhongganbucepingxiaoyicc 
analysis applies to both. (Surveying the effectiveness of cadres 
23 The national law on the dossier system in Central Committee Offices at city 
was approved by the 22nd session of level), Shehui Kexue, 1987, No. 8., pp. 
the Standing Committee of the Na- 54-55, 16. Also, Laodong Renshibu 
tional People's Congress, September 5, Xingzhengguanli Kexue Yanjiusuo 
1987. For the earlier regulation see Guo- Zuzhi bianxia, Guojia gongwuyuan 
jia Danganju, Danganguan gongzuo zhidu jianghua (National civil service 
tongze (National Dossier Office, system explained) (Beijing: Laodong 
General rule on dossier offices), April Renshi Chunbanshe, 1988). 
26, 1983. The basic dossier office is at 26 See, for instance, Wu Yue, ))Difang 
the county level, numbering 2,100, 85 dangzheng lingdao ganbu xuanba yu 
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jiandu zhuandong moshi de libi 30 For instance see Laodong Renshibu 
zhiyaocc (Advantages and disadvan- Xingzhengguanli Kexue Yanjiusuo 
tages in the revolving pattern of choice Zuzhi bianxia, Guojia gongwuyuan 
and supervision of local leading cadres zhidu jianghua, pp. 111-112. 
in Party and government), Zhengzhixue 31 ccZubu chexiao Guowuyuan ge bumen 
Yanjiu Ziliao, 1988, No. 2, pp. 24-28; E dangzucc (Gradually abolish party cells 
Zupei, ))Dangqian lingdao ganbu dui in every ministry under the state coun- 
peishun de xuqiucc (Currently arrang- cil), and ~ Z u b u  chexiao Guowuyuan ge 
ing leading cadres in orderly se- jijianzu he zhong jiwei paizhu jijianzucc 
quence), Hubei Dangjiao Xuebao, 1987, (Gradually abolish all party discipli- 
No. 3, pp 30-32; Wang Ziji, vXin xing- nary groups and central disciplinary 
shixia de xin keticc (New task under new committee's control over the groups in 
form), Changbai Xuekan, 1987, No. 4, pp. the state council), Renmin Ribao, August 
49-52. 1, 1988, pa 1. 
27 The latest Law on Local People's Con- 32 Fazhan Yanjiusuo Zonghe Keti Zu, ed., 
gress and Local Administration was ap- Gaige: mianlin zhidu ckuangxin (Reform: 
proved by the National People's Con- facing new ideas on institutions) 
gress on December 2 1986. The (Shanghai, 1988), pp. 219-233. 
observations in this paper are based on 33 See Liu Zhenwei, Wang Zhenyao, eds., 
another field survey, on the working of Xiangcun zuzhi fizki gdige (System re- 
the Local People's Congress and of Vil- form of township-village organization) 
lage People's Committee, in 3 counties, (Beijing: Zhongguo Linye Chubanshe, 
3 cities, 2 districts, 6 townships and 4 1987), pp. 119-120. 
villages. For a detailed discussion see 34 They include, Temporary Provisions 
Thiagarajan Manoharan, ))The working Regarding Arrangements Helping the 
of the 1986 Local People's Congress Settling Down of Old, I11 and Disabled 
Lawcc (forthcoming). Cadres, June 2,1978; Temporary Provi- 
28 The PRC law on establishment of vil- sions Regarding Old Cadres' Leaving 
lage People's Committee went into ef- the Party for Rest and Recuperation, 
fect on June 1, 1988. April 13, 1982; Decision on the En- 
29 For some illustrative job specifications hancement of Retirement Benefits and 
see Guojia Jingwei Zhicheng Gaige Living Allowances of Part-time Em- 
Gongzuo Bangongshi, Pinren jingji ployed Senior Officials, June 28, 1983. 
zhanyezhiwu wenjian huibian (Collection 35 For details see Tan Jian, ed., Guojia 
of documents on contract appoint- Gongwuyuan Shouce. (Handbook on na- 
ments) (Beijing: Qiye Guanli Chuban- tional civil service) (Beijing: Shehui 
she 1987). Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 1988), 
Chapter 13, pp. 238-250. 
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